A Primer on Culture and a Warning about Role Models

Like any human enterprise, culture can serve as a vehicle for good or evil. What of our culture? The values modeled by those in power give us a clue.

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Listen or Read. Your Choice.

In Part 3 of Adam’s Evolutionary Journey, I said, “Human beings are indoctrinated into sin at the same time and in the same way that we learn language … and music, and art, and conformity to social norms, all of which are aspects of human culture. Mimesis and enculturation explain how ‘original sin’ arose and continues to be propagated.”

Culture, in my view, serves as the vehicle for sin, but that doesn’t mean culture is sinful and nothing but sinful. Like any human enterprise, culture can be good or evil. Literature, music, and art aren’t evil, but people can use them to propagate evil. Culture provides structure, but the structure doesn’t limit our freedom or predetermine our choices. Language, for example, provides a structure for communication, but within that structure we have limitless possibilities to express our thoughts, whether in blessing or cursing. Likewise, culture is a structure, but within its boundaries we are free to explore the limits of human creativity … or cruelty.

What, then, is culture? When most people think of culture, they associate it with literature, art, or music, as I just did, but that doesn’t cast a wide enough net. According to Harvard sociologist Orlando Patterson, [1] cultural knowledge can be defined as our “shared meanings about the world,” which includes quite a bit under its umbrella.

Regular followers may recall my discussion of the crucial role played by sharing and cooperation in human evolution. Take language, for example. Human language requires “shared meanings” on numerous levels. Obviously, people have to agree upon the meaning of words, but we also have to agree how to use them, which translates into syntax and grammar. If someone invented their own, private grammar, no one would understand them. Human language thus relies entirely upon shared meanings and cooperation to function. [2] Anthropologist Sarah Hrdy credits sharing the duties of parenthood for laying the groundwork of human cooperation, making possible language and, eventually, morality. [3]

Still, “shared meanings” is a difficult concept to wrap the mind around. What does it include? “Common knowledge” is an easier idea to grasp. One aspect of this is our “declarative knowledge” of facts and events. Science is an example of shared factual knowledge, while history is the name we give shared knowledge of past events. But these examples hardly scratch the surface of cultural knowledge. It also encompasses “procedural knowledge,” or what we might call “know-how” and skills.

There’s a world of difference between riding a bicycle and being able to describe a bike and explain how to ride it.

Some things can be learned only by practical experience, not by descriptions or rules. In the classic example, there’s a world of difference between riding a bicycle and being able to describe a bike and explain how to ride it. The same holds true for speaking a language, knowing good and evil, and falling in love. None of those human activities can be truly understood without practical experience, and each of the examples I provided is appropriate to a different stage of life. We learn how to speak words as infants, but children don’t master the grammar of their native language until the age of 5 or so. Kids begin learning proper behavior as toddlers, but society doesn’t hold them morally or legally responsible for their actions until they’re 10-13 years old. And if a boy that age told his mother he’d fallen in love, she’d likely smile and explain that what he felt wasn’t really love. He’s not mature enough for that experience.

Connecting sociology to Adam and Eve, the question comes to mind: If they were specially created and placed in a garden with no company but themselves and, occasionally, God, how did they learn to speak? As Patterson pointed out, a large part of the “shared meanings” that constitute common knowledge require actual experience to appropriate and understand. Even if God implanted word meanings and the rules of grammar in their minds, Adam and Eve still wouldn’t know how to speak. How do we know how to greet a stranger? It’s a ritual learned from years of observation and practice during childhood. The memory of actually doing the thing so ingrains itself that the procedure becomes automatic, but that unthinking response must draw upon memories of actual events to function. Otherwise, the brain regards the situation as new, and the response is no longer automatic; it must be thought out.

The reason, according to Patterson, is our capacity to categorize cultural knowledge using words, concepts, and metaphors to make sense of reality. [4] The brain translates these categories into mental shortcuts called “schemata,” which are a basic feature of human cognition. Schemata relate new information to previously recognized patterns and processes. Thus, the mind perceives the world as structured information rather than a series of “arbitrary or unpredictable attributes.” Consider having to respond to every situation – no matter how routine – as a novel or random event. The mind would be overwhelmed rather quickly. Sometimes, schemata cause us to see the world as we think it should be rather than as it is, which is one reason we can’t always trust our perceptions. On the whole, however, schemata make us smarter by making our brains more efficient; information is retrieved rapidly and delivered in a ready-to-use form.

Consider having to respond to every situation – no matter how routine – as a novel or random event. The mind would be overwhelmed rather quickly.

Now, back to Adam and Eve. Imagine they were created by God relatively recently – let’s say around 10,000 BC. Put them in a garden somewhere in Mesopotamia, and after they sin and get kicked out, they must integrate into an existing society. With no experience of this foreign culture, how would Adam and Eve survive? It’s often asserted that Adam was the first farmer. [5] Having never experienced even the passing of the seasons, how would he fare in his new trade? Would he know how deep to plant a seed, or how much to water it? Even more troubling, how would Adam and Eve know anything of social behavior? Would Adam have known not to take someone else’s property? The concept of “ownership” makes zero sense for a married couple living in paradise. For all Adam knew, every plant and tree belonged to him, so taking fruit from another man’s garden would seem perfectly natural. Human beings internalize “normal” behavior and recognize even the slightest deviation. As I’ve said elsewhere, it’s hard not to foresee an Adam ignorant of culture dying of stupidity in short order. I suspect Gilgamesh would’ve killed him straightaway. The problem of a specially created Adam and Eve learning to speak pales in comparison with the totality of knowledge they would’ve had to learn to survive and “blend in” with an existing culture after leaving Eden. The only way to account for their possession of cultural “know-how” is for God to implant such knowledge in their minds as schemata, but without the underlying experiences, such schemata would be meaningless. The only solution is that God implanted false memories in their minds, and that, I submit, is a concept not worthy of God.

I previously defined culture as “shared meanings” or “common knowledge,” but what makes something common knowledge? As Patterson explains it, “Knowledge is common when all persons in a group not only share a given form of meaningful information but knowingly know that all persons know it, ad infinitum.” That sort of knowledge requires a bit of mind-reading called “theory of mind.” In essence, theory of mind is the ability to make inferences about another individual’s beliefs, goals, and intentions. Without theory of mind, an individual can observe behavior, but inferring a motive is beyond reach. One could observe that “Mary is looking in the drawer,” but that’s the end of it. [6] Let’s call that “zero-order” theory of mind. In contrast, first-order theory of mind allows an individual to supply a motive: “Mary is looking in the drawer … because she wants a piece of chocolate.”

Both young children and chimpanzees have first-order theory of mind, [7] but by about 6, human children start to acquire second-order theory of mind, [8] which allows them to understand a statement such as, “Alice believes that Bob knows that Carol is throwing him a surprise party.” In simpler terms, “A believes that B knows that C intends (blank).” Second-order theory of mind virtually requires recursive syntax and embedding (e.g. modern language). That’s not the end of the story, though. Studies of children around the age of 10-11 show they’ve mastered second-order theory, but their performance at third level is “only slightly better than chance, and at fourth level is at chance. This contrasts with adults, who perform much better than chance at fourth level but not fifth.” [9] An example of third order would be “A believes that B knows that C thinks that D intends (blank).” Thanks to the flexibility of language, mature adults can take this even farther. Consider Shakespeare’s play “Othello.” By the end of the second act, the audience understands that Iago intends that Cassio believes that Desdemona intends that Othello believes that Cassio did not intend to disturb the peace. How many levels of intention has Shakespeare introduced? (Don’t forget to count the audience too. Even as I write this, I’m trying to infer how my audience will understand what I’m trying to communicate.) These higher orders of thinking are only possible thanks to the recursive features of language. In light of my previous discussion of children’s language development, none of this should come as a surprise. Children acquire complete syntax and grammar, including recursion and embedding, around the age of 5, and they understand metaphoric thought by about 10. Higher-order theory of mind thus seems to develop in tandem with children’s language capabilities.

Before continuing, allow me to hit “pause” for a moment to correct two common misunderstandings about language and culture. Many animals communicate with one another, but a means of communication isn’t in the same ballpark as human language. Modern language, as opposed to proto-language or animal communication, includes the full suite of grammar such as flexibility, embedding (subordinate clauses), and recursivity. Every known human language includes those features. On the other hand, many primates do have a form of culture. Among chimps, for example, vocalizations are inborn, but gestures are learned. Since this qualifies as “shared knowledge,” chimps have culture, but it’s limited by their theory of mind.

Since theory of mind falls under the rubric of “social cognition,” researchers have offered several possible evolutionary explanations for its appearance. The Machiavellian intelligence hypothesis [10] says higher-order theory of mind bestows a competitive advantage by allowing an individual to deceive and manipulate others more effectively. Deception, by its very nature, requires theory of mind. One actor is intentionally causing another actor to believe something false. On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Vygotskian hypothesis counters that theory of mind can best be explained through social cooperation, not competition. [11]

A third hypothesis suggests higher order theory of mind may be required for mixed-motive interactions involving both cooperative and competitive elements, such as a negotiation. [12] Consider the task of sharing a pie. Individuals can cooperate to make the overall pie larger, yet they also compete to obtain the biggest possible slice for themselves. When a recent study modeled just such a task, [13] agents with zero-order theory of mind focused solely on competition, and negotiations broke down. Eventually, there was no pie left to share. Agents with first-order theory of mind performed slightly better. They could reason about the goals of their trading partners and thus keep negotiations alive, but they rarely came out ahead when dealing with zero-order agents. Apparently, a small slice of pie is preferable to no pie at all.

The results changed dramatically when second-order agents were introduced. When negotiating with a partner also capable of theory of mind, the size of the pie always was maxed out, and the second-order agent typically received the larger share. The authors explained that “second-order theory of mind provides agents with a strategy that balances cooperative and competitive goals…. (They) behave cooperatively, not because they have an innate sense of fairness … but because they believe that it will result in a better outcome for themselves.”

As always, everything human comes with mixed motives, both good and evil.

Having defined culture and described its cognitive basis, I’ll close with an overview of how it’s reproduced from generation to generation. Patterson calls this “the puzzle of persistence.” [14] He details seven mechanisms by which culture is transmitted from one generation to the next, but I want to focus on the two most common: Enculturation and Institutional Reproduction.

Enculturation, which also goes by the names “social learning” and “socialization,” is by far the most prevalent way that culture reproduces itself, primarily during childhood and adolescence. As I pointed out in Adam’s Evolutionary Journey, the primary way people learn is mimesis, or imitation. To illustrate, even adults confronted with an unfamiliar social situation will look at what others are doing and copy their behavior. The process is so ingrained and self-evident that Patterson complains many sociologists have neglected other methods of cultural reproduction.

I mentioned earlier that chimpanzees have a form of culture, but they also learn differently than we do, particularly when it comes to procedural knowledge or skills. A mother will teach a juvenile how to strip leaves off a branch to make a tool to fish for termites, but the learning process is painstakingly slow for the simple reason that chimps are trying to copy the final product, rather than imitating the process. [15]

What’s also frequently forgotten is the importance of role models in enculturation. From parents to teachers to peers, role models literally “model the role” that children and young people imitate and internalize as “normal” behavior and morality.

The key to institutionalizing a value is to concentrate power in the hands of those who believe in that value.

Arthur Stinchcombe

The second most common method of cultural reproduction is institutional. A cultural institution is a value or routine that has become part of the “taken-for-granted” social fabric. This can be something as simple as greeting a stranger or as complex as holding a funeral. In fact, the more institutionalized and complex that a routine is, the less it relies on childhood socialization. Some institutional processes are simply too complex for children to learn. Patterson says, “Institutions are not strictly learned; they are enacted or performed.… Thus, for over a thousand years, the single most important institutional rite in the Western world, the Catholic mass, was conducted in a language that the vast majority of participants did not understand.”

How do values become institutionalized? In his influential book Constructing Social Theories, Arthur Stinchcombe said, “The key to institutionalizing a value is to concentrate power in the hands of those who believe in that value.” [16] From there, those in power promote their favored values “by selection, socialization, and controlling conditions of incumbency and hero worship.” Patterson summarizes institutional reproduction in even more dire terms:

“The powerful select those who share their values and other cultural preferences, and they control the processes of socialization. They also act as ego-ideals, as role models for ambitious younger persons, ensuring that the cultural processes they favor will be disproportionately imitated and re-enacted.… Power-backed beliefs and values also have a much greater chance of being popularly adopted, due to general admiration for the powerful and their proponents’ greater access to communicative channels.”

Think about the importance of role models for young children, and the values modeled by those presently in power. Christians can rationalize that they vote for policies and not for saints, but don’t fool yourselves. The behavior modeled by those in power is absorbed and imitated by your children and mine. And for “ambitious younger persons,” those in power serve as “ego ideals” for “hero worship.” Chilling words indeed.

If you don’t think our culture is being permanently altered for the worse right before your eyes, you don’t understand culture.

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[1] Orlando Patterson, “Making sense of culture,” Annual Review of Sociology 40 (2014): 1-30.

[2] Jordan Zlatev, “The co-evolution of human intersubjectivity, morality and language” in The Social Origins of Language, eds. D. Dor, C. Knight, and D. Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 249-266.

[3] Sarah B. Hrdy, Mothers and Others: The Evolutionary Origins of Mutual Understanding (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009).

[4] Patterson, “Making sense of culture.”

[5] See, for instance, Answers in Genesis https://answersingenesis.org/adam-and-eve/what-was-adam-like/.

[6] Harmen de Weerd, Rineke Verbrugge, and Bart Verheij, “Negotiating with other minds: the role of recursive theory of mind in negotiation with incomplete information,” Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems 31, no. 2 (2017): 250-287.

[7] Josep Call and Michael Tomasello, “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later,” in Human Nature and Self Design (mentis: 2011): 83-96.

[8] Bethany Liddle and Daniel Nettle, “Higher-order theory of mind and social competence in school-age children,” Journal of Cultural and Evolutionary Psychology 4, no. 3-4 (2006): 231-244.

[9] Liddle and Nettle, “Higher-order theory of mind.”

[10] Andrew Whiten and Richard Byrne, Machiavellian intelligence II: extensions and evaluations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

[11] Henrike Moll and Michael Tomasello, “Cooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis,” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 362, no. 1480 (2007): 639-648.

[12] Rineke Verbrugge, “Logic and social cognition: The facts matter, and so do computational models,” Journal of Philosophical Logic 38 (2009): 649–680.

[13] de Weerd, Verbrugge, and Verheij, “Negotiating with other minds.”

[14] Orlando Patterson, “The mechanisms of cultural reproduction: Explaining the puzzle of persistence,” in Routledge Handbook of Cultural Sociology (Routledge 2018): 122-132.

[15] Erin E. Hecht et al., “Process versus product in social learning: comparative diffusion tensor imaging of neural systems for action execution-observation matching in macaques, chimpanzees, and humans,” Cerebral Cortex 23, no. 5 (2013): 1014–1024.

[16] As cited by Patterson, “The mechanisms of cultural reproduction.”

Tagged as: Literal Adam & Eve, Culture, Mimesis, Enculturation.